The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

by Matt Andrews
ISBN-10:
1107016339
ISBN-13:
9781107016330
Pub. Date:
02/11/2013
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
ISBN-10:
1107016339
ISBN-13:
9781107016330
Pub. Date:
02/11/2013
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

by Matt Andrews
$99.99 Current price is , Original price is $99.99. You
$99.99 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
  • PICK UP IN STORE
    Check Availability at Nearby Stores

Overview

This book explains why many institutional reforms in developing countries have limited success and suggests ways to overcome these limits. The author argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781107016330
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 02/11/2013
Pages: 268
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

Matt Andrews is a fellow at the Center for International Development at Harvard's Kennedy School and the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. His numerous articles have appeared in journals such as Governance, the International Public Management Journal, the Public Administration Review, Oxford Development Studies, Public Administration and Development and the Journal of Development Studies. Prior to his fellowship at Harvard, Professor Andrews was a vice president of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management and supported various government leaders in South Africa during the transition from apartheid. He has worked in more than twenty-five developing and transitional countries as a permanent member of the World Bank and as a Harvard University academic doing research on development and government reform. Dr Andrews received his PhD from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Table of Contents

Preface; 1. Change rules, change governments, and develop?; 2. Deconstructing the puzzling evidence of reform; 3. Overlooking the change context; 4. Reforms as overspecified and oversimplified solutions; 5. Limited engagement, limited change; 6. What you see is not what you get (expecting limits); 7. Problem-driven learning sparks institutional change; 8. Finding and fitting solutions that work; 9. Broad engagement, broader (and deeper) change; 10. Reforming rules of the development game itself.
From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews